A few other reasons, bearing on the strategic situation at Dunkirk, are given, but in this article, I propose to present one that has been greatly overlooked, but for which there is substantial evidence.
Following the war, B.H. Liddell Hart, one of the foremost military historians of the 20th century, and author of works on military strategy and the two World Wars, among others, enjoyed the opportunity to visit with, and interrogate many key figures in the German war effort. In 1948, he came out with a book based on these conversations, entitled The Other Side of the Hill, though published in some places under the title The German Generals Talk. I highly recommend this book for any student of military history. A wide range of topics are covered, from campaigns, to the anti-Hitler plot which culminated in the assassination attempt of July 20th, 1944, to schisms between Hitler and the general staff, opinions of lionized officers such as Erwin Rommel, and opinions of Germany’s primary foes during the war.
Dunkirk is also discussed in this vital historical work. To set the background: Following the victory over Poland in 1939, Hitler advocated an immediate attack upon the French in the west, not knowing that the French, who had been reluctant to enter the war in the first place, had no intentions of an offensive against Germany, but planned on a defensive campaign, probably with the ultimate aim of winning another war of attrition. Early war plans by Hitler and the General Staff would have played into this strategy, and really included no higher aim than the capture of certain points of strategic value, which would enable them to prosecute naval and air warfare against Britain. Originally, Hitler envisioned no sweeping victory, such as had been gained in Poland. But after numerous postponements of the offensive, due to a combination of circumstances, Hitler eventually adopted the ambitious scheme of the brilliant officer Erich von Manstein. “Operation Sickle-cut” was the masterpiece which would knock France out of the war in weeks. Powerful German armored forces would slice through the supposedly impassable Ardennes Forest of Belgium and France, then race to the coast, cutting off a large portion of the French army, and the entire BEF. The success of this scheme is well known. Spearheaded by one of the great geniuses of armored warfare, Heinz Guderian, the Germans sliced through the French defenses, beat off a few counterattacks, and reached the sea, cutting off thousands of French troops who had been sent into Belgium, along with Britain’s entire force. The beaten, demoralized allies retreated along the coast, and soon the only port offering escape was Dunkirk. Towards this point, the shattered British and French retreated.
The aggressive German generals wanted to pursue their beaten foe right into Dunkirk, and capture the whole bag. But, to their great frustration, Hitler issued an order to halt. At first, some German commanders tried to ignore it, but Hitler reiterated the order, and the victorious panzer forces were halted for three days, allowing the British and French to escape by sea, despite harassment from the Luftwaffe.
Why the nonsensical halt order, when the enemy was beaten, and with no chance of stopping the powerful German army? Later, Hitler would offer different excuses for his blunder. He told Field Marshal von Kleist, “I did not want to send the tanks into the Flanders marshes-and the British won’t come back in this war.” To others, he explained that he was concerned by the mechanical breakdown of many of the tanks, and wanted to have sufficient armored forces left to finish the French off.
But on May 24th, 1940, while the campaign was still in progression, Hitler expressed a deeper, more political motive, to members of Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt’s staff. This was reported by General Blumentritt to Liddell Hart, and I feel it is necessary to quote extensively from Blumentritt’s narrative:
“Hitler was in a very good humor, he admitted that the course of the campaign had been ‘a decided miracle,’ and gave us his opinion that the war would be finished in six weeks. After that he wished to conclude a reasonable peace with France, and then the way would be free for an agreement with Britain.
“He then astonished us by speaking with admiration of the British Empire, of the necessity for its existence, and of the civilization that Britain had brought into the world. He remarked, with a shrug of the shoulders, that the creation of its Empire had been achieved by means that were often harsh, but ‘where there is planing, there are shavings flying.’ He compared the British Empire with the Catholic Church, saying they were both essential elements of stability in the world. He said that all he wanted from Britain was that she should acknowledge Germany’s position on the Continent. The return of Germany’s lost colonies would be desirable but not essential, and he would even offer to support Britain with troops if she should be involved in any difficulties anywhere. He remarked that the colonies were primarily a matter of prestige, since they could not be held in war, and few Germans could settle in the tropics.
“He concluded by saying that his aim was to make peace with Britain on a basis that she would regard as compatible with her honor to accept.”
An incredible tale, and yet, it fits with the admiration Hitler expressed for Britain in Mein Kampf. Hitler offered peace to the British twice during World War 2, and also, according to Liddell Hart, displayed uncharacteristic timidity in planning an invasion of England, once Churchill made it plain his nation would not agree for peace. A strange attitude for a leader to have in a war, true, but then, Hitler was a strange man with strange ideas, and a very complex personality.
General Blumentritt’s tale is confirmed by Leon Degrelle, of the Belgian Waffen-SS, who Hitler greatly admired, and occasionally confided in. During one discussion with his Fuhrer, Degrelle states: “We talked about England. I asked him bluntly: “Why on earth didn’t you finish the British off at Dunkirk? Everyone knew you could have wiped them out.” He answered: “Yes, I withheld my troops and let the British escape back to England. The humiliation of such a defeat would have made it difficult to try for peace with them afterwards.”
Some may protest Degrelle’s testimony, since he was one of the very few who attempted to defend Hitler at all after the war. But Liddell Hart argues that men like Blumentritt had no plausible reason to invent such a story, and in fact would have impressed their conquerors more by portraying themselves as the ones who attempted to preserve British security and survival. Instead, they told the story that the generals wanted to crush the British for good, and end the war, while Hitler’s dithering cost them a great, perhaps decisive, victory. If this is true, it certainly calls into question the idea that Hitler intended to conquer the whole world. I have argued, and the evidence here, from Hitler’s own mouth, seems to confirm that his goal was to establish German hegemony on the continent of Europe, and leave themselves free from outside (particularly British) interference. But each person has their own ideas on this subject. The Dunkirk story lends important new evidence to the discussion.
Of course it is hard to find a final answer, because of the variety of ideas. So, instead of leaving the reader with my own impressions, I will conclude with the words of B.H. Liddell Hart, who concluded his discussion of Dunkirk with these fascinating sentences: “Was this attitude of his towards England prompted only by the political idea, which he had long entertained, of securing an alliance with her? Or was it inspired by a deeper feeling which reasserted itself at this crucial moment? There were some complex elements in his make-up which suggest that he had a mixed love-hate feeling towards England similar to the Kaiser’s. Whatever be the true explanation, we can at least be content with the result. For his hesitations came to Britain’s rescue at the most critical moment of her history.”
I believe it is not true that Hitler was so naieve to let the British troop escape in peace because he wanted things more difficult and so Peace would be impossible
Hitler wanted to have peace with britain and trun around to the real Enemy – Communist Bolshivest Jewish as he alwasy said !
His idea of Russia as Raw material and vast space was really shown on his speechs and the deep hate to the Communist is no secret !
Edward P. Von der Porten in his Book published in 19 ” The German Navy in World War Two”
said :In late May of 1940 when German Army had reached the Channel, Hitler had not yet thought seriously about the next step .
in the war againest Britain .may 21th General Raeder first brought up the Naval Operation staff study Hitler showed little interest and he said After France collaps no service other than the Navy thinking about Sea Lion “Operation of Invading England ”
Hitler also write in hs Final Testimony “I never wished a war againest Britian or America ” he never mentioned France or Poland or Russia becasue it is true he hide hostile and deep emotion to attack tgem .
Perhpas France was th least among them ; take into consideration France declared war on Germany first
Another alternative is that Hitler intended to let the Luftwaffe & Goering finish off the BEF, rather than having the Wehrmacht hog all the glory. The Nazi party and the German Army seem to have been at loggerheads on more than one occasion and Goering, as one of Hitler’s early buddies, was the only Nazi with real military power (if not competence). As a result, he often influenced military strategy in unproductive ways (cf Stalingrad resupply) due to his wish for glory.
People call it the miracle at Dunkirk, because it was really pulling a rabbit out of the hat, not because it was immediately obvious that the German ‘error’ was going to result in a successful British withdrawal.
It was the climax of a powerstruggle between Hitler and the Wehrmacht Command.
Teran, above, wrote “It was the climax of a powerstruggle between Hitler and the Wehrmacht Command.”
I came to this site as part of a search for information regarding a powerstruggle between Hitler and the Wermacht Command, as an explanation for Hitler stopping Guderian at the moment of victory.
Apparently, Teran holds this opinion, and I wish he had expanded on it a little.